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Abstract
We model Moore’s Law as eﬃciency of computer producers that rises as a
by-product of their experience. We ﬁnd that
• Because computer prices fall much faster than the prices of electricity-
driven and diesel-driven capital ever did, growth in the coming decades
should be very fast, and that
• The obsolescence of ﬁrms today occurs faster than before, partly because
the physical capital they own becomes obsolete faster.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In 1965, the co-founder of Intel, Gordon Moore, predicted that the number of tran-
sistors per integrated circuit would double every 18 months. This has come to be
known as Moore’s Law. The Pentium 4 processor arrived in 2000 with 42 million
transistors. The 2001 arrival of the Itanium processor, with 320 million transistors, is
ahead of Moore’s schedule. Recently, even Moore has wondered if this kind of growth
can continue. But Meindl, Chen, and Davis (2001) suggest that it can go on for at
least another 20 years. By then, a chip will have more than a trillion transistors and
the computing power of the human brain.
Moore’s Law states, in other words, that the eﬃciency of computer producers
grows very fast. We argue that the Law is an example of a rise in eﬃciency that always
occurs among producers of any good as a by-product of their experience with making
and selling it. Electricity and internal combustion, for example, are technologies for
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1which similar laws have held over long periods, although the improvements were less
dramatic.1
We adopt an Arrow (1962) type of formulation in which aggregate experience fully
determines the growth of eﬃciency. Our results are:
1. The long-run growth rate and the approach to it depend on three parameters
(Proposition 1): (i) The share in output of the capital to which the law applies,
(ii) the elasticity of capital-producers’ eﬃciency with respect to experience, and
(iii) proportionally on the rate of labor growth,
2. The approach to the steady-state is slower than it would be in Solow (1956). The
bigger the technology’s learning potential, the longer the transition (Proposition
2),
3. Firms’ market—to-book values reﬂect the age and type of capital that the ﬁrms
own; they decline faster with age in high-tech epochs and high-tech sectors and,
4. After ﬁtting the model to three technologies — Electricity, internal combustion,
and information technology — it predicts that in the coming decades consump-
tion will grow much faster than it did during the 20th century because the
cost of computing falls much faster than the cost of machines did 70-100 years
ago. We do not have a precise forecast, but the best ﬁt of the model implies a
long-run productivity growth of 7.6 percent per year.
Why focus on experience?–The engine of growth in our model is not investment,
but experience. Now, we know that R&D raises ﬁrms’ proﬁts and eﬃciency and that
schooling and on-the-job training raise workers’ pay and productivity. Such invest-
ment raises output, but by just how much depends on the return to the investment.
That rate of return depends, in turn, on just what kind of investment is made. And
this is where experience comes in. It teaches us what kind of research will yield fruit,
which subjects students should learn in school, and what kind of training workers
should get on the job. Vernon (1966) argues that the American ﬁrm maintains its
lead because it sells to the world’s richest and most sophisticated customer, and so
learns from him and adapts to his wants. This customer’s wants dictate the kind of
product that he will buy, and his skills dictate the technology that his employer must
use. Dealing with him keeps the ﬁr mo ni t st o e sa n da h e a do ft h ep a c k .
Sustained productivity growth is probably impossible if nothing is invested in
education, training, or research, but the payoﬀ to that investment will depend on
1Neither Thomas Edison nor Rudolf Diesel were as good as Moore at predicting the future
development of the technologies that their ideas helped spawn. They were overly optimistic. For
example, in 1912 Diesel predicted that diesel motors would soon use plant oils (Anso and Bugge,
2001)a n di n1922, Thomas Edison predicted that “the motion picture is destined to revolutionise
our educational system and ... in a few years it will supplant largely, if not entirely, the use of
textbooks” (Oppenheimer, 1997).
2what precise products and processes are targeted. Market experience provides ﬁrms
with the signals they need in order to make the best choices. With a general-purpose
technology (GPT), the big impact of experience lies probably in the development
of the GPT’s applications. For computers, the applications are software and the
internet, for electricity they were household appliances and light industrial equipment,
and for the internal combustion engine they were automobiles and trucks. These are
the products that link the GPT to the ultimate wants of the consumer and the cost-
saving needs of the manufacturer, and this is where experience really counts.
2 Three learning curves
T h el e a r n i n gl a w .–If returns to scale are constant and if competition is atomistic,
the average cost of producing a good equals its equilibrium price. Thus we can simply







where B is a constant. The log-linear version of (1)i s
lnpt = β0 − β lnKt−1,
where β0 = −β lnB. We estimate this equation for three general-purpose technolo-
gies: Computers, electricity, and the internal combustion engine. Figure 1 presents
pairwise combinations of lnpt and lnKt−1 on an annual basis for each technology and
plots a regression line through the points. The axes denote indices of the variables p
and K but on a log scale.
Estimates of β.–Table I shows our estimates of β and the average growth rates
of p and K,d e n o t e db ygp,a n dgK. The computer has by far the highest β, |gp|,
and gK.2 The process started slowly — the 1960’s were the age of the mainframe and
minicomputer, and in spite of a fast-growing K as indicated by the horizontal spacing
b e t w e e nt h ep o i n t s ,t h ed e c l i n ei np was relatively slow — and since then it has kept
2To construct a quality-adjusted price index for computers, we join the “ﬁnal” price index for
computer systems from Gordon (1990, table 6.10, col. 5, p. 226) for 1960-78 with the pooled
index developed for desktop and mobile personal computers by Berndt, Dulberger, and Rappaport
(2000, table 2, col. 1, p. 22) for 1979-99. Since Gordon’s index includes mainframe computers,
minicomputers, and PCs while the Berndt et al. index includes only PCs, the two segments used
to build our price measure are themselves not directly comparable, but a joining of them should
still reﬂect quality-adjusted price trends in the computer industry reasonably well. We then obtain
a quality-adjusted measure of computer production by deﬂating the nominal dollar value of ﬁnal
computer sales from the National Income and Product Accounts (Bureau of Economic Analysis,
2001, table 7.2, line 17) with our price index, cumulating the result over time, and setting the index
to 1000 in the ﬁnal year of the series (i.e., 1999). Finally, we divide our price index for computers
by the implicit price deﬂator for GDP (Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2001, table 3) to build the
normalized price index that appears on the vertical axis of Figure 1 a n di nt h er e g r e s s i o n su s e dt o
estimate β, and set the index to 1000 in the ﬁrst year of the series (i.e., 1960).
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(c) autos, trucks, and buses
  Fig. 1. Prices and cumulative quantities of “New” Economy products.TABLE I
Estimates of β
Technology ˆ β gp gK
Computer 0.62 -24.12 39.11
Electricity 0.35 -2.127 . 11
Automobile 0.20 -2.19 13.29
accelerating. The wider vertical spacing after 1990 suggests that the eﬀects of learning
by doing have now become even stronger. Our estimate of β exceeds Gordon’s (2000),
partly because his data do not cover the latest price declines, and partly because we
use diﬀerent sources.3 Nevertheless, while rising at the very high rate of 24% per
year, the quality of capital per dollar spent doubles only every 2.9 years. This is very
fast, but not as fast as the 18 months that, according to Moore’s Law, it takes the
eﬃciency of computer chips to double. Evidently, other components of computers do
not evolve quite as fast as computer chips.
Panels (b) and (c) of Figure 1 and the last two rows of Table I show that for
electricity usage and automobile sales the relation between K and p is ﬂatter than
it has been for computers.4 We choose annual electricity output rather than a cu-
mulative measure because the accumulation of electrically-powered and long-lasting
equipment is probably proportional not to cumulative but to current electricity usage.
(Cumulative usage leads to similar estimates of β). For motor vehicles, we use
3We also estimate the learning parameter with a time trend in the speciﬁcation. The trend term
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for computers and positive and signiﬁcant for electricity and
automobiles. The β coeﬃcient for computers falls to -0.87 and is no longer statistically signiﬁcant,
while the β’s for electricity and autos become -0.745 and -0.230 respectively and remain signiﬁcant.
Since our learning model does not include a time trend in the pricing process, we use the β’s from
the trendless speciﬁcation in our analysis.
4Electricity prices are averages of all electric energy services in cents per kilowatt hour from the
Historical Statistics of the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1975, series S119, p. 827)
for 1903, 1907, 1917, 1922, and 1926-70, and from the Statistical Abstract of the United States for
1971-89. We interpolate under a constant growth assumption between the missing years in the early
part of the sample. For 1990-2000, prices are U.S. city averages (June ﬁgures) from the Bureau of
Labor Statistics (http:www.bls.gov). We then divide the price index by the implicit price deﬂator
for GDP, joining the series from Balke and Gordon (1986, table 1, pp. 781-782) for 1903-1929 with
that of the Bureau of Economic Analysis for later years, and set it to 1000 in the ﬁrst year of the
series (i.e., 1903).
We construct the quantity measure as the total use of electric energy (kilowatt-hours) for 1902,
1907, 1912, 1917, and 1920-70 from Historical Statistics (series S120, p. 827), again interpolating
between missing years assuming constant growth. For 1971-2000, we join the total electric energy
consumed by the commercial, residential and industrial sectors (in BTU’s) from the U.S. Federal
Power Commission. We then set the index to 1000 in the ﬁnal year of the series (i.e., 2000).
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  Fig. 2. Actual and predicted prices of “New” Economy products.the quality-adjusted value of cumulative sales.5
Is learning faster in booms?–The relation between K and p is negative, but does a
rise in K cause p to fall as (1) would imply? Do investment booms lead to faster price
declines? Apparently so. Let us take a look at low-frequency co-variation between K
and p.I nF i g u r e2 ,w eu s et h et h r e ee s t i m a t e so f( 1)r e p o r t e di nF i g u r e1 to compute
a series of price predictions, ˆ p ≡ ˆ β0 − ˆ β lnKt, and plot them along with the data —
not as a function of K (as we did in Figure 1) but as a function of t. In the left
panels we plot the logs of ˆ pt and pt, and in the right panels we plot the deviations of
their logs from linear time trends. The two series are in all three cases positively and
signiﬁcantly correlated. For example, both electricity and autos boomed in the late
1910’s and 1920’s, and their ˆ pt’s also decline sharply at these times. Then they both
slumped during the Great Depression and showed very little price decline. Figure 2
also shows that the post-1990 acceleration in the price decline for computers is not
due to a failure of (1) but, rather, mostly to a speed-up in the growth of K.F o r
computers, however, price declines lead output growth.
Other evidence on the learning curve in (1).–Klenow (1998) notes that plant-
level productivity-growth and labor input are positively correlated, which indirectly
supports (1). Most micro evidence would reject the extreme form of (1) because a
ﬁrm’s own experience matters more to its eﬃciency than the experience of others.
In quarterly data, for example, Irwin and Klenow (1994) ﬁnd that semiconductor
ﬁrms learn only about a third as much from the experience of others as they do
from their own experience, and in monthly data on wartime shipbuilding, Thompson
a n dT h o r n t o n( 2 0 0 1) ﬁnd that the contribution of the experience of others is even
smaller. The diﬀerence arises probably because the transfer of information from
ﬁrm to ﬁrm is slow and incomplete. When information ﬂows fully and instantly —
as it did among subjects in some experiments run by Merlo and Schotter (2000) —
5Quality-adjusted (hedonic) prices for new motor vehicles for 1906-40 are from Raﬀ and Trajten-
berg (1997, table 5.4). We linearly interpolate between these estimates, which are available every
two years, to construct an annual series. For 1947-83, we use hedonic prices from Gordon (1990,
table 8.8, col. 6, p. 345) as joined by Raﬀ and Trajtenberg to their series. We use ﬂuctuations
in the wholesale prices of motor vehicles and equipment from Historical Statistics (series E38, p.
199) to approximate the series between the endpoint of Raﬀ and Trajtenberg (i.e., 1940) and the
starting point of Gordon (i.e., 1947). For 1984-2000, we use producer prices of motor vehicles from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (http://www.bls.gov). This ﬁnal segment is not adjusted for quality,
yet quality improvements in the auto industry have been far less dramatic in recent years than in
the earlier part of our sample. We join the various components to form an overall price index.
We build a quantity index using the value of factory sales of cars, trucks and buses for 1906-70
(Historical Statistics,s e r i e sQ 149 and Q151,p .7 16), ratio-spliced to the industrial production index
for automotive products (Economic Report of the President, 2000, table B-52) for 1970-2000. We
then obtain a quality-adjusted measure of motor vehicle production by deﬂating with the price index
described above, cumulating the result over time, and setting the index to 1000 in the ﬁnal year of
the series (i.e., 2000). We then divide our price index for motor vehicles by the GDP deﬂator and
set the result to 1000 in the ﬁrst year of the series (i.e., 1906) to obtain the normalized prices that
appear on the vertical axis in Panel (c) of Figure 1.
7watching someone else perform a task is as eﬃciency-enhancing as learning by doing.
In reality, the distinction between own and outside experience probably fades only at
low frequencies so that in annual data the distinction probably still matters. But the
simplicity of (1) delivers the analytic results and is thus a good place to start.
3M o d e l
The model is a version of Arrow (1962) but with a production function for ﬁnal goods










where c is per capita consumption, ρ is the discount factor and σ is the elasticity
of substitution. From this we have the relation between gc,t, the growth rate of per





Final good.–The constant-returns-to-scale production function for ﬁnal goods is
Y = Nf(k),
where K is capital, N is labor in eﬃciency units, k = K/N,a n df (·) is increasing
and concave. Assume that N grows at the rate gN.







where c is consumption per worker and q is the number of new computers per unit
of output foregone. The number of new machines produced is dK
dt = q(Y − Nc).
Learning by capital producers.–Since capital does not depreciate the current
stock, K, is also the cumulative output of capital. We assume that the law in (1)
holds. Competitive supply of capital then means that the price of K always equals









If β =0 , q is a constant and this is a one-sector Solow (1956) type model with no
technological progress.
8Investment.–A ﬁrm is too small to aﬀect K and it perceives pt as given. It will
























The implied rental price, f0 (k), equals the user cost of capital rp −
dp
dt, so that the








α; α + β < 1. (8)
The model’s long-run properties are as follows:
Proposition 1 The long run growth-rates of c, p, k and K are
gc =
αβ
1 − α − β
gN. (9)
gp = −
β (1 − α)




1 − α − β
gN. (11)
and
gK = gk + gN =
1 − α
1 − α − β
gN. (12)
Proof. With f as in (8), (6) reads




Since k = N−1Bp−1/β,( 13) reads






9If r, gN and gk are constants, the second term on the right-hand side must also be
constant, which means that







This in turn implies (10). Since gk + gN = −gp/β,w eh a v e( 11), and since gy = αgk,
this implies that the per capita growth of output and consumption is (9). (12) follows
at once.
Properties.–Growth is proportional to the growth of labor, gN, and increasing in
α and β. It becomes inﬁnite as α + β → 1. The parameters of the utility function
aﬀect only the level of output and the rate of interest.
3.2 The transition
We now solve for the evolution of Kt from some starting value K0. We do it only for
the special case of linear utility — i.e., σ =0 .T h i sﬁxes the interest rate at r = ρ.
Free riding causes diﬀusion lags.–When σ > 0,w ee x p e c td i ﬀusion lags would
arise because rapid accumulation of K would bid up r.B u tw h e nσ =0 , r is constant
at ρ, and any lags that may arise in the diﬀusion of K will occur for one reason alone:
The desire to free ride by waiting for the price of K to decline further. This is clear
from the user cost formula (7). A major diﬀerence between our model and Solow’s,
however, is that the explicit solution (15) is based on the assumption that σ =0 ,
and for this case convergence in Solow’s model is instantaneous, or at least the Solow
economy would invest its entire output until the steady state capital-labor ratio is
reached. The same extreme outcome occurs here, but only when σ and β are both
zero. This makes sense because when β =0our model collapses to Solow (1956).









and b =( 1− α − β) α
βAB−β.T h e n
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at the exact rate a given in (14).
10gK 
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Figure 3: Growth of K as a function of z.
Proof. Since σ =0 , rt = ρ for all t. Using (13),
gp = ρ − αA
kα−1
p




























But, also from the deﬁnition of z,





Solving (17) leads to (15).
Having solved for zt,w et h e nc a ns o l v ef o rKt and all the other variables. Equation
(17) allows us to also express how the growth of gK converges to its steady state value
as z reaches b/a. Figure 3 shows that relation.





a (speed of 
convergence) 
Figure 4: The eﬀect of α on a and gc.
The speed of convergence.–Eq. (14) shows that the speed with which z converges
to its steady-state value is decreasing in α and β. Ah i g h e rα means that the marginal
product of capital diminishes more slowly. A higher β oﬀsets the decline in the
marginal product of capital by reducing the price of new capital. As β → 0, a →∞
because the free-riding incentives disappear, and convergence is immediate.
The dual eﬀect of α.–The Cobb-Douglas form of (8) implies that the share of
new capital is constant. A higher α slows down the transition rate, a, but raises long-
run consumption growth gc = αβ/(1 − α − β). Herein lies the tension we face in
ﬁtting the transition and in getting a realistic rate for long-run consumption growth.
The tension is evident in Figure 4, which will be useful in explaining the results of
the projections that we shall make. Note how sensitive long-run growth is to α as it
approaches the value 1−β and as the rate of convergence approaches its lowest value
of (1 − β)gN.
Incorporating a second capital.–Computers are not the only capital in the econ-
omy and, hence, some capital does not take part in the learning. The value of α is
therefore smaller than capital’s share in output. We now introduce a second cap-
ital, the price of which is ﬁxed at unity. Only a few lines of algebra are needed.







Assuming that x depreciates at the rate δ,i t sr e n t a l ,r + δ, would be equated to its
12marginal product, γAkα∗































The analysis goes through exactly as before, but with α given by (18).
4 Simulations
In this section we report the results of simulations that focus on the diﬀusion of
information technology and on the diﬀusion of a composite technology that includes
both electricity and internal combustion. We could ﬁnd adequate data only for the
United States and conﬁne our parameter choices accordingly even though we think of
the world economy as the right unit just as Kremer (1993) did in a similar context.
In the solution for zt in (15), the parameters α, β,a n dgN are given to us from data
other than kt. Table 2 reports the values for these parameters that we will use in two
sets of calibrated simulations, which we refer to as “baseline” and “adjusted”.
TABLE II
Parameter Choices for Simulations
Baseline Adjusted
Technology ˆ α ˆ β ˆ gN ˆ α ˆ β ˆ gN
Computers. 0.21 0.62 2.05 0.35 0.62 1.05
Electricity 0.27 0.35 2.27 0.44 0.42 1.27
Autos 0.04 0.20 2.26 0.08 0.28 1.26
Electricity+Autos 0.29 0.34 2.26 0.47 0.411 .26
13Baseline simulations.–For this set of simulations, we picked the parameters as
follows:
1.F o rα, we use data on shares of the GPT-capital, α∗, and the remaining capi-
tal, γ, and apply (18). The share of computers in equipment investment over
1960-2000 is about 30 percent. But if we include software and other forms of
IT-related investment, the share is now nearly 60 percent (Bureau of Economic
Analysis, 2001,t a b l e1). If capital’s share in output, after allowing for struc-
tures, is about 30 percent, this implies an α∗ of 0.18 for the share of computers
in output and a γ of 0.12. Eq. (18) then gives an α of 0.21 for computers.
Autos and electricity are concurrent and so we consider them both individually
and together. For 1900-1940, Devine (1983, pp. 349, 351) reports that electric
motors were the source of mechanical drive for about 87 percent of machinery
by 1939, with internal combustion being the source of another 2 percent. Since
the latter must have excluded cars and trucks, it is an underestimate, and we
will assume a share of 10p e r c e n t . W ec h o o s es h a r e sf r o m1939 because they
are the closest available observations to the mid-point of our sample. Assum-
ing once again a 30 percent share of capital in output delivers an α∗of 0.26 for
electricity, 0.03 for autos, and 0.29 for the two combined. These imply γ values
of 0.04, 0.27, and 0.01 respectively, from which we compute the estimates of α
reported in the left panel of Table II.
2. For β we use the elasticities reported in Table I. When building the composite
for electricity and motor vehicles, however, we weight the β’s for the individual











3. For gN we use the U.S. population growth plus one percent per year as an
adjustment for the growth of labor quality — this adjustment is based on Denison
(1962, Table 32, p. 266), who reports a contribution of 0.67 percent of education
to the growth in national income over the 1920-57 period.7 We round this
number upward to 1 percent to account for changes in the quality of education.
Adjusted simulations.–For this set of simulations, we treat labor quality diﬀer-
ently, and adjust β upwards. The details are as follows:
6We also weight the price and quantity indices for electricity and motor vehicles in this way when
constructing the composites used in our simulations.
7We obtain population data from Bureau of the Census, “Historical National Population Esti-
mates” (Census Bureau web page), which includes July 1 estimates of the resident population for
1900-99. Members of the Armed Forces overseas are included in the totals for 1940-79 only. Data
for real personal consumption expenditures are from the Survey of Current Business (August 2000,
table 2A) for 1929-2000, and from Balke and Gordon (1986, pp. 787-8) for 1900-28.
141. Instead of adjusting gN for quality, we raise capital’s share. In the context
of Solow’s model, to get realistic convergence speeds, Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1992, p. 227) use a “broad” capital share of 0.8. In that case α = α∗/(1 − γ)
is higher because γ includes human capital. Given the size of our β estimate for
computers, however, using a capital share of 0.8 would violate the constraint
that α + β < 1. We therefore will use a more modest value for the “broad”
capital share of α∗ + γ =0 .67 in the adjusted simulations.
2. Measurement error in K would cause our procedure to underestimate the abso-
lute value of β. Also, the price-index for computers may inadequately recognize
quality — the computer performs a lot of functions and it is unlikely that we
could measure them all. The auto price series is quality-adjusted for the 1906-40
period and the 1947-83 periods, but the limited number of product character-
istics that Raﬀ and Trajtenberg (1997) could reliably use in constructing these
hedonic prices, when coupled with rapid changes in the quality of the charac-
teristics themselves, suggests that, per quality unit, auto prices fell faster than
our Figure 1 reports. This means that the true beta for autos is larger than
the one that we estimate, at least before the Second World War. To correct
for measurement error and the possibility of inadequate adjustment for quality
changes, we increase the β for motor vehicles by 40 percent. Finally, our use
of electricity production as a stand-in means that we probably do not measure
electricity-capital well. This is because one kilowatt produces more utils now
than it did earlier in our sample period due to substantial improvements in the
quality of equipment. We correct for this by raising the β for electricity capital
by 20 percent.
3. For gN we use the U.S. population growth and do not adjust for quality, since
it is now included in the broader capital share.
Figure 5 presents the transitional dynamics for computers, and Figure 6 shows
them for the electricity-auto composite. With α and β pinned down by the data,
we are left with two free parameters: z0 and A/Bβ (or, simply, b). To facilitate
comparisons across the technologies, we choose values for these two parameters so
that the predicted time-path of kt passes through the ﬁrst and fortieth year of the
empirical time-path of kt.P a n e l( a )i ne a c hﬁg u r eu s e st h eb a s e l i n ev a l u e so fα and
β from the left panel of Table II, and reports the values of a, b,a n dz0 implied by
our ﬁtting of the time paths. Panel (b) in each ﬁgure shows that a dramatic shift in
the time path of kt is possible when we simultaneously raise α, β, and the share of
capital in output as indicated for the “adjusted” model. These adjustments generate
diﬀusions with an S-shape. In other words, the transition path for z must always be
concave, as (15) makes clear, but because k is a transform of z that essentially takes
z to a power greater than unity, k can acquire a convex portion early on when β is
large enough. Our “adjusted” parameter settings, when substituted into (9), imply
1516
Year 






















































α=.47, β=.41, z0= .1185,
a=.0184, b=.0025
Parameters:
(a) baseline model (b) adjusted model 
Fig 5. Computer systems: Actual and predicted diffusions.
(a) baseline model (b) adjusted model
  Fig. 6. Electricity and motor vehicles: Actual and predicted diffusions.17
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(b) Electricity and motor vehicles
  Fig. 7. Productivity growth: Actual and predicted.a steady-state growth rate for consumption of 7.6 percent per year, and thus an
optimistic outlook for consumption in the 21st century.
Fitting the model to productivity growth after 1960 and after 1900.–Figure 7
compares productivity growth for the two sets of technologies. We have forty years
or so of coverage for the computer and about a hundred years for electricity and
internal combustion. All three technologies were around for decades before they
appear on our diagrams, but one can argue that when they come into our view, they
are at a similar stage of development. In any event, this is what we shall assume,
and therefore we can extrapolate the future of the computer from the experience
of the other two technologies. The ﬁgure shows that the model overpredicts the
productivity growth of the economy between 1975 and the end of the sample. This
is the well known productivity slowdown paradox, and our model does nothing to
resolve it. The model also overpredicts productivity between 1910a n d1924. Then,
in both cases, there is a period of underprediction, followed in the end by a period of
overprediction. We summarize all of this in Table III.
TABLE III
Implications of Model Extrapolations
Electricity and Autos Computers
underpredict 1903—1908 (5 years) 1960—1973 (13y e a r s )
overpredict 1909—1940 (31 years) 1974—1999 (25 years)
underpredict 1941—1993 (52 years) 2000— ?
5T h e ﬁrm’s age and its market-to-book value
When there are no costs to adjusting capital, the value of capital inside a competitive
ﬁrm must equal the value of capital outside of it. Our model predicts that a fall in
the price of capital should manifest in the market values of those ﬁrms that use that
type of capital — the GPT-using ﬁrms. To support this claim, we shall now establish
the following facts: The faster is the decline in the price of new capital, the faster
will the value of capital inside the ﬁrm decline, especially in the sectors that use the
capital in question.
Market-to-Book ratios for ﬁrms.–As capital does not depreciate, the book value of
a unit of capital purchased at date τ is always pτ.A td a t et>τ, the market-to-book





A ﬁrm owns capital of various ages. Let Ks be the amount of vintage-s capital that
18the ﬁrm owns, and let τ b et h ed a t et h a tt h eﬁrm started up. At date t>τ,t h e














where κτ = Kτ/
Ps
τ=t Kτ is the fraction of the ﬁrm’s capital that is of vintage τ.W e










w h e r ew eu s e d( 10), and where
T
K = T h ea v e r a g ea g eo ft h eﬁrm’s capital stock.
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where “j”i saﬁrm index. The equation (21) would arise in a steady state in which,
f o rs o m er e a s o n ,t h ea g eo fc a p i t a ld i ﬀered over ﬁrms.
Market-to-book ratios vs. the age of the ﬁrm’s capital.–We estimate (21). To
compute a ﬁrm’s ˆ T K,w et a k et h eo p e n i n gb o o kv a l u eo faﬁrm’s property, plant,
and equipment (item 182) for the year that it enters Compustat and apportion it
equally to each pre-Compustat year, using the year of incorporation as the start-up
date and assuming a depreciation rate of 8.5 percent. Direct purchases of property,
plant and equipment (item 128) and capital obtained through acquisitions of other
ﬁrms (item 129) are available for later years. Using these annual investment ﬁgures,
the depreciation rate, and the year of incorporation, we then compute the average
age of the capital stock using the shares of each ﬁrm’s 1998 capital attributable to
past years as weights. Data on investment are available only for recent decades and
so the 1998 cross-section is the only one that we analyze.8 The results are in Table
IV.
8We assume that a ﬁrm invests a constant amount I in each year from incorporation until
appearance in the Compustat ﬁles. With this investment strategy, the average age of capital for a








j=0(1 − δ)j × j
)
,
where δ is the depreciation rate. Investments in later years are direct purchases of property, plant,
and equipment (item 128). This item includes new and used equipment, but we treat them all as
19TABLE IV
Regressions of Log Market-to-Book Ratios
on the Age of Firm Capital, T K,i n1998
constant TK R2 (obs.)
IT ﬁrms 1.692 -0.082 .099
(15.8) (-4.17) (155)
All ﬁrms 1.054 -0.035 .034
(34.4) (-8.74) (2191)
All ﬁrms (with 1.337 -0.022 .161
sector eﬀects) (36.6) (-5.32) (2191)
Note: T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath
the coeﬃcient estimates.
In Table IV the coeﬃcients on TK are all negative and signiﬁcant at the 5 percent
l e v e l .T h es t e e p e rs l o p ef o rt h eI Tﬁrms continues to suggest a much higher rate of
depreciation of ﬁrm-values for the IT ﬁrms than for ﬁrms in general. The coeﬃcient-
estimate of T K is comparable to estimates that use plant-level data: Sakellaris and
Wilson (2001) estimate that the quality of equipment in plants declines at 8-17pe r c e n t
for each year of age, and Bahk and Gort (1993) estimate it at 13 percent. Others
estimate much lower numbers. Our estimates are between 2.2 and 8.2 percent.




j = age of ﬁrm j,
deﬁned as the number of years since ﬁrm j incorporated or, alternatively, since it
listed on a stock exchange.9 Table V reports the regressions of M/B on T F.I t







K0(1 − δ)T +
PT
j=0(1 − δ)jXT−j
× (T − j)
)
+ K0(1 − δ)Tagek,s,
where K0 is the capital stock at the time of Compustat listing, and Xi is direct investment in
subsequent years. We also have the value of capital obtained through acquisition of other ﬁrms
(item 129) and include it in updating the size of the total depreciated capital stock in each year.
We assume, however, that this acquired capital enters at the average age of the ﬁrm’s capital in the
year of acquisition and then depreciates at the same rate as the rest.
The approximation ignores inﬂation. Correcting for inﬂation is not possible for the pre-listing
period since the opening capital stock is a book value. Given that the vast majority of the ﬁrms in
our 1998 sample entered Compustat after 1980, the lack of inﬂation adjustment for the subsequent
annual invesment ﬁgures should have minimal eﬀects. Overall, however, our computation will tend
to understate the “true” age of a ﬁrm’s capital.
9Listing years for 1925-98 are those in which ﬁrms enter the CRSP database. The CRSP ﬁles
include all NYSE-listed ﬁrms from 1925, with AMEX ﬁrms added in 1962 and Nasdaq ﬁrms added
in 1972. For 1885-1924, listing years are those in which prices ﬁrst appear in the NYSE listings of
The Annalist, Bradstreet’s, The Commercial and Financial Chronicle,o rThe New York Times.W e
20TABLE V
Regressions of Log Market-to-Book Ratios on Firm Age (T F)
By incorporation date By date of exchange listing
constant TF R2 (obs.) constant TF R2 (obs.)
1998 Cross-section
IT ﬁrms 1.561 -.0085 .035 1.384 -.0132 .018
(20.3) (-3.34) (216) (30.5) (-3.47) (637)
All ﬁrms 0.856 -.0007 .001 0.832 -.0017. 0 0 1
(46.9) (-2.00) (3004) (72.3) (-3.27) (6730)
All ﬁrms (with 1.137 -.0002 .175 1.077 -.0000 .136
sector eﬀects) (125.8) (-0.64) (3004) (9.77) (-0.04) (6730)
1920 Cross-section
Electricity- -.0462 -.0039 .011 .0099 -.0106 .038
intensive ﬁrms (-0.81) (-0.40) (36) (0.09) (-1.32) (38)
Transportation -.0285 -.0043 .011 .1405 -.0275 .115
ﬁrms (-0.18) (-0.65) (18) (0.87) (-1.90) (19)
Electricity excl. -.0034 -.0060 .023 -.0855 -.0033 .006
transportation (-0.02) (-0.82) (17) (-0.65) (-0.38) (18)
All ﬁrms -.3553 .0039 .018 -.2845 -.0024 .001
(-6.59) (2.85) (239) (-4.76) (-0.53) (233)
All ﬁrms (with .0055 .0063 .151 .0186 0.029 .206
sector eﬀects) (1.07) (3.64) (239) (2.24) (0.69) (233)
Note: T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath the coeﬃcient estimates.
groups ﬁrms into GPTs and others. The upper panel of the table considers the 1998
cross section in which we take the IT ﬁrms to be GPT. The sample includes those
ﬁrms in the Compustat database that were active in 1998, for which market and book
values are available, and for which we could determine the year of exchange listing or
incorporation.10 We identify IT ﬁrms by their Standard Industry Classiﬁcation (SIC)
codes.11 For “all ﬁr m s , ”w ee s t i m a t es p e c i ﬁcations of (10) with and without dummy
variables for SIC two-digit sectors.
Using either measure of T F,t h ec o e ﬃcients on T F a r en e g a t i v ea n ds i g n i ﬁcant at
the 5 percent level for the IT ﬁrms in 1998. If we consider the mean age in the IT
obtain years of incorporation from Moody’s Industrial Manual (1920, 1928, 1955, 1980), Standard
and Poor’s Stock Market Encyclopedia (1981, 1988, 2000), and various editions of Standard and
Poor’s Stock Reports. See Jovanovic and Rousseau (2001) for a detailed description of these data
and sources.
10To compute market values, we take the value of common equity at current share prices, and
add in the book value of preferred stock and short- and long-term debt. Book values are computed
similarly, but use the book value of common shares rather than the market value. We omitted ﬁrms
with negative values for net common equity from the plot since they imply negative market to book
ratios.
11We identify “IT” ﬁrms as those with SIC codes for oﬃce equipment and computers (3570-79),
and programming and data processing (7370-79).
21sample of 13.7 years since incorporation, the coeﬃcient on age (-.0085) in the upper
left panel of Table V implies that an IT ﬁrm that is one year younger would have a
market-to-book ratio that is 0.9 percent higher. The second line in Table V presents
results for all ﬁrms in our sample, and the third line augments the speciﬁcation with
sectoral ﬁxed eﬀects. In both cases, the coeﬃcients on TF are much smaller in absolute
value. For example, evaluated at the sample mean age of 20 years since incorporation,
the coeﬃcients in the regression without sectoral ﬁxed eﬀects relate one less year of
life with a market-to-book ratio that is larger by less than 0.1 percent. The results
with sectoral eﬀects indicate an even smaller eﬀect of age on market-to-book ratios.
Note, too, that the inﬂation of the ’70s and ’80s eroded the book values of the older
ﬁrms and acted to inﬂate their M/B ratios relative to those of the younger ﬁrms.
This would bias the results against our hypothesis that the coeﬃcient of T F is higher
today than it used to be.
The lower panel of Table V presents estimates of (21) for a sample of NYSE-listed
ﬁrms in 1920. We compute market-to-book ratios using prices and the number of
outstanding shares from our backward extension of the CRSP database, and using
balance sheet items from the 1921 Moody’s investor manuals.12 We group the sample
into ﬁrms that are “electricity-intensive,” producers of transportation equipment, and
all ﬁrms. The electricity-intensive ﬁrms are those identiﬁed by David (1991,T a b l e5 ,
p. 329) as having more than 80 percent of their horsepower driven by electricity in
1919. These include tobacco products (SIC 2100), electrical machinery (SIC 3600),
fabricated metals (SIC 3400), printing and publishing (SIC 2700), and transporta-
tion equipment (SIC 3700). Since transportation equipment ﬁrms, including those
manufacturing autos, trucks, buses, motorcycles and railroad equipment, are a sub-
set of the electricity-intensive group, we also examine the electricity ﬁrms with the
transportation ﬁrms excluded.
The regression coeﬃcients are negative for both measures of age for the electricity
and transportation ﬁrms, though most of them are not statistically signiﬁcant at the
5 percent level. The slopes are more steeply negative for the transport ﬁrms than for
the electricity-intensive as well, suggesting that the internal combustion technology
was evolving to render its immediate predecessors obsolete even more rapidly than
i nt h ec a s eo fe l e c t r i c i t y .T h i sﬁnding is consistent with the strikingly rapid declines
in price and increases in quantities that characterize the auto industry in the 1910’s
12To be precise, we draw balance sheet data from Moody’s Industrial Manual, Moody’s Public Util-
ities Manual, and Moody’s Transportation Manual. Since balance sheet items are not as uniformly
deﬁned across ﬁrms in these early Moody’s manuals as they are in today’s Compustat, we must
compute the market-to-book ratio for 1920 ﬁrms a bit diﬀerently. In this case, the numerator of the
ratio is the book value of common equity (including surplus and retained earnings) less the book
value of common shares, to which we add in the market value of common shares and the book value
of long-term debt. The denominator is the sum of the book values of common equity and long-term
debt. The diﬀerence between the measures for 1920 and 1998, then, is the inclusion of short-term
debt in both numerator and denominator of the ratio in 1998. The omission of short-term debt in
1920 imparts an upward bias to the market-book ratios computed in that year.
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Age K = 2.48 + .082 Age Firm
Figure 8: Capital age vs. ﬁrm age for IT ﬁrms in 1998
(see Figure 1). Interestingly, when we expand the sample to include all ﬁrms in 1920,
we ﬁnd positive coeﬃcients on T F in three of the four speciﬁcations, and a very small
negative coeﬃcient in the exception case.
Why do old ﬁrms have lower M/B values?–How much of the loss in market-to-
book value is from the aging of the ﬁrm’s capital stock? Is aging capital the only
reason why older ﬁrms have lower M/B values? Table VI reports the regressions of
TABLE VI
Regressions of TK on TF in 1998
constant age (TF)R 2 (obs.)
IT ﬁrms 2.484 0.084 .333
(9.23) (9.16) (155)
All ﬁrms 3.378 0.068 .389
(38.8) (38.1)( 2 191)
Note: T-statistics appear in parentheses beneath
the coeﬃcient estimates.
T K on T F. They show that T F raises T K by 0.085 in the IT sector and only by 0.068
in other sectors. Figures 8 and 9 are scatterplots of these relations.
I ft h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient of TF were entirely due to the aging of physical capital,
23Years from Incorporation







Age K = 3.38 + .068 Age Firm
Figure 9: Capital age vs. ﬁrm age for all ﬁrms in 1998















The coeﬃcients of T F in the top panel of Table V and the coeﬃcients of TK in Table
I Vc a nt h e nb eu s e dw i t ht h ee s t i m a t eo fdTK/dT F from Table VI to compute both
sides of (22). The comparison is feasible only for 1998. The results are in Table VII.
TABLE VII
Estimates of (22) in 1998
Actual decline Explained via TK Unexplained decline
−[LHS of (22)] −[RHS of (22)] [LHS−RHS]
IT ﬁrms 0.0132 0.082(.084) = 0.0069 0.0063
All ﬁrms 0.00170 . 0 3 5 (.068) = 0.0024 -0.0007
Table VII shows that the obsolescence of physical capital plays a more important
role in the obsolescence of IT ﬁrms than it does in the obsolescence of non-IT ﬁrms.
On the other hand, other, unexplained factors are also more important for IT ﬁrms,
whereas all of the obsolescence of the non-IT ﬁrms seems to be explained by the
obsolescence of their capital stocks.
24The eﬀect of underreported book values.–For tax reasons, ﬁrms tend to depreciate
their capital faster than it wears out physically. Thus the book value of capital
understates the historical cost of the surviving capital, and this bias is strongest for
old capital. If pK were constant, this bias would lead to the ﬁnding that older ﬁrms
have higher M/B ratios than young ﬁrms, and that older capital fetches a higher
market value per unit of book. This all means that our estimates of the eﬀects of T K
and T F on M/B are both biased towards zero. In spite of that, our estimates show
them both to be signiﬁcantly negative.
6 Relation to other growth models
Several growth models are related to ours.
Arrow (1962):–Learning by Arrow’s capital-goods producers is the same as in
our model, i.e., (1). But he assumes that in the ﬁnal-goods sector there are ﬁxed pro-
portions between capital and labor, and this complicates the analysis so that he can
calculate only the steady state growth path. Our limiting growth rate is proportional
to the rate of labor growth, as in Arrow (1962) and also in Jones (1995) where the
scale eﬀect works not through the accumulation of experience but through research.
Another interpretation of (1)i si m p l i c i ti nA g h i o na n dH o w i t t( 1998) who explain
how, by raising income, a larger capital stock raises the demand for new research and
thus raises the eﬃciency of future capital. One can view (1)a sas u m m a r yo fs u c ha
process.
Frankel (1960) and Romer (1986):–In these models aggregate capital aﬀects the
production of ﬁnal goods directly. The eﬀect appears similar to ours if we write













0 (k)=r.( 2 3 )
The incentives to invest in the Frankel-Romer model, as summarized by (23), are
therefore quite diﬀerent from the incentives in our model. When our marginal condi-





0 (k)=r − gp.( 2 4 )
Since gp < 0,o u rﬁrms will invest less, and our transition will be slower than in the
Frankel-Romer model, in which the ﬁnal goods producer beneﬁts from spillovers on
all the units of his capital, k, regardless of when they are installed. Our model, on
25the other hand, is a vintage-capital model in which the owner of a machine does not
beneﬁt from future technological improvements, and that is why −gp deters invest-
ment.
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995).–The rate in (14) is exact, but that comes at
the expense of assuming σ =0 . Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, ch. 2) work with a
positive σ, and so their results are not a special case of ours, but their rates are only
approximations around the steady state. When σ =0 , their result is the same as
ours when β =0 . In this case convergence is instantaneous.
7C o n c l u s i o n
We modelled Moore’s law as arising from learning by doing in the sector that makes
computers. We assumed that the law would continue to operate for ever, and de-
rived long-run implications and worked out the transitional dynamics. We found
that combining this model with Arrow-style learning can slow down the speed of
convergence, perhaps even to realistic levels. We also found that incumbent ﬁrms are
losing ground faster today than they did eighty years ago, and we argued that this is
so largely because old ﬁrms use older capital.
Nothing like Moore’s Law has ever operated for as sustained a period of time and
for as large an investment item. Never before, in other words, have capital goods
declined in price as fast as they are doing at present. If population or the quality of
labor continue to grow at historical levels, in the coming decades consumption growth
will probably rise well above its twentieth-century average.
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